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Understanding the “90% Syndrome” in Software 
Project Management: A Simulation-Based Case Study 
Tarek K. Abdel-Hamid 
Department of Administrative Sciences, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
There is ample evidence in the literature to indicate that the 
“90% syndrome” is pervasive in software project manage- 
ment. The objective of this paper is to report on a study of 
this important phenomenon. Our research vehicle is a 
System Dynamics simulation model of the software develop- 
ment process. Model results obtained from an analysis of a 
NASA software project indicate that the problem arises 
because of the interaction of two factors: underestimation 
and imprecise measurement of project progress due to poor 
visibility. The model is used to investigate the viability of two 
project strategies for “curing” the 90% syndrome problem. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The impressive improvements that are continuously 
being made in the cost effectiveness of computer hard- 
ware are causing an enormous expansion in the number 
of applications for which computing is becoming a 
feasible and economical solution. This, in turn, is 
placing greater and greater demands for the development 
and operation of computer software systems. A conserv- 
ative estimate indicates a tenfold increase in the demand 
for software each decade [ 11. 
This growth in the demand for software has not, 
however, been painless. The record shows that the 
development of software has been marked by cost 
overruns, late deliveries, poor reliability, and user 
dissatisfaction [24]. 
In this paper we focus on one difficulty that plagues 
many software projects, namely, the “90% syn- 
drome.” Baber [5] provides the following description of 
the problem: 
Estimates of the fraction of work completed [increase] as 
originally planned until a level of 8040% is reached. The 
programmer’s individual estimates then increase only very 
slowly until the task is actually completed. 
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There is ample evidence in the literature to indicate 
that this phenomenon is pervasive in software project 
management (e.g., see Refs. 6 and 7). This is cause for 
serious concern, since the consequences of the 90% 
syndrome on project management can be quite disrup- 
tive. Boehm [6] explains: 
Frequently, the manager of such a programmer would note 
the 9O%-complete estimate, proceed to negotiate an assign- 
ment on a new project for the programmer after the 
following week, and schedule the routine to be passed on to 
the integration team at that time. This meant that a week 
later, when the job was not done and was now estimated at 
95% complete, the manager had to go back to the project 
manager who was expecting the programmer and renegoti- 
ate the transfer for a week later, and similarly with the 
manager of the integration activity. After a few more such 
weekly negotiations, people get bitter and don’t trust each 
other, and the entire project control process begins to 
disintegrate. Further, the blight often spreads to other 
projects through the uncertainties of interface integration 
and the delays due to performers who do not show up on 
time. 
Our objective in this paper is to investigate the 
underlying structural causes of the 90 % syndrome and to 
examine project management strategies for preventing 
it. Our research vehicle is a comprehensive simulation 
model of the software development process developed 
using the techniques of System Dynamics. 
2. THE DE-A SOFlWARE PROJECT: A CASE 
STUDY 
The DE-A software project was conducted at the 
Systems Development Section of NASA’s Goddard 
Space Flight Center (GSFC) at Greenbelt, Maryland, to 
design, implement, and test a software system for 
processing telemetry data and providing attitude deter- 
mination and control for the DE-A satellite. The 
development and target operations machines were the 
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IBM S/360-95 and -75. The programming language was managers at NASA were therefore quite interested in 
Fortran. addressing this control problem. 
At the start of the project, the estimates for system 
size, total development effort, and schedule were 16,000 
delivered source instructions (DSI), 1100 man-days, and 
320 working days, respectively. 
3. THE NEED FOR AN EXPERIMENTATION 
VEHICLE 
Upon completion, the DE-A project’s actual results 
were as follows: 
Project size 24,400 DSI 
Development cost 2200 man-days 
Completion time 380 working days 
Figure 1 depicts the project’s reported progress rate. 
Clearly, progress reporting does manifest the 90% 
syndrome pattern, although perhaps much less acutely 
than is experienced in many other organizations. For 
example, Figures 2a and 2b depict other project patterns 
reported in Refs. 6 and 7, respectively. In organizations 
involved in developing embedded software systems, 
which is the case at NASA, the organizational disrup- 
tions that result can be particularly painful. When 
software development lies on the critical path of a larger 
endeavor, any disruptions in the software delivery 
schedule, especially when they occur toward the end of 
the project, can seriously hamper the progress of the 
whole project and cause economic losses that far exceed 
the cost overrun of the software component [8]. Project 
In software engineering it is remarkably easy to propose 
hypotheses and remarkably difficult to test them. Con- 
trolled experiments have proven to be too costly and 
time consuming [9]. Furthermore, the isolation of the 
effect and the evaluation of the impact of any given 
practice within a large, complex, and dynamic project 
environment can be exceedingly difficult [lo]. Accord- 
ingly, it is useful to seek other methods for testing 
software engineering hypotheses. 
Simulation modeling provides a viable experimenta- 
tion tool for such a task. In addition to permitting less 
costly and less time-consuming experimentation, simu- 
lation-type models make “perfectly” controlled experi- 
mentation possible. Indeed: 
Figure 1. Reported progress on the DE-A project. 
The effects of different assumptions and environmental 
factors can be tested. In the model system, unlike the real 
systems, the effect of changing one factor can be observed 
while all other factors are held unchanged. Such experi- 
mentation will yield new insights into the characteristics of 
the system that the model represents. By using a model of a 
complex system, more can be learned about internal 
interactions than would ever be possible through manipula- 
tion of the real system. Internally, the model provides 
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Jbehm [6]. 
its policies, and its sensitivities to various events. (Forres- 
tf2r Cl 11) 
In the remaining parts of this paper we propose a 
system dynamics-based simulation approach to the 
study of the software development process is general and 
to the 90% syndrome in particular. An overview of the 
model’s structure is first presented in Section 4. This is 
then followed by a more detailed discussion of the 
model’s control subsystem and the experimental results 
pertaining to the 90% syndrome. 
4. A SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF SOFM’ARE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Our study of software project control is being conducted 
within the context of a much broader research effort to 
study the dynamics of the software development proc- 
ess. A major part of this effort is devoted to the 
development of a comprehensive System Dynamics 
computer model of software development. The model is 
currently being used in several research capacities, one 
of which is to serve as a laboratory vehicle for 
Man. weeks comoleted 
%“igUte 2. (b) 90% syndrome example in DeMarco percent Done 
[71. 
(Repotted) 
conducting experimentation in the area of project con- 
trol, the topic of this paper. In this section we provide an 
overview of the model. A full description of the model’s 
structure, its mathematical formulation, and the valida- 
tion experiments performed on it are provided in other 
reports [ 12-141. 
The model was developed on the basis of data 
gathered in field interviews of software project man- 
agers in five organizations. This was complemented by 
an extensive database of empirical findings gathered 
from the literature. The model’s formulation Integrates 
the multiple functions of the software development 
process, including management-type functions (e.g., 
planning, controlling, and staffing) as well as software 
production-type activities (e-g+, designing, coding, re- 
viewing, and testing). Figure 3 depicts the model’s four 
major subsystems: (1) the Human Resource Manage- 
ment subsystem; (2) the Software Production subsystem; 
(3) the Control subsystem; and (4) the Planning subsys- 
tem. The figure also illustrates some of the interrelations 
among the four subsystems. 
The Human Resource ~~gement subsystem cap- 
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tures the hiring, training, and transfer of the human 
resource. Such actions are not carried out in vacuum but 
are affected by the other subsystems; for example, the 
hiring rate is a function of the workforce level needed to 
complete the project by a given date. Similarly, availa- 
ble workforce has direct bearing on the allocation of 
personnel among the different production activities. 
The four main software production activities are 
development, quality assurance, rework, and testing. 
The development activity comprises both the design and 
coding of the software. As the software is developd, it 
is also reviewed to detect any errors; e.g., using 
structured walkthroughs. Errors detected through such 
activities are reworked. Not all software errors are 
detected during development, however; some escape 
detection until the testing phase. 
As progress is made, it is reported. A comparison of 
the degree of project progress to the planned schedule is 
captured within the Control subsystem. Once an assess- 
ment of the project’s status is made, it becomes an 
important input to the planning unction. 
In. the Planning subsystem, initial project estimates 
are made and then revised, when necessary, throughout 
the project’s life. For example, to handle a project that is 
perceived to be behind schedule, plans can be revised to 
(among other things) hire more people, extend the 
schedule, or do both. 
fn addition to integrating the managerial and technical 
aspects of software development, our modeling ap- 
proach has a second important feature, the use of the 
feedback principles of System Dynamics. Feedback is 
the process in which an action taken by a person or thing 
eventually affects that person or thing. The significance 
Figure 3. Overview of model S t r U C N r e . 
of the feedback systems concept and its applicability to 
managerial systems have been substantiated by a large 
number of studies [15]. For example, Weick [15] 
observes: 
The cause-effect relationships that exist in organizations are 
dense and often circular. Sometimes these causal circuits 
cancel the influences of one variable on another, and 
sometimes they amplify the effects of one variable on 
another. It is the network of causal relationships that 
impose many of the controls in orga~t~ons and that 
stabilize or disrupt the organization. . . . Though not directly 
visible, these causal patterns account for more of what 
happens in organizations than do some of the more visible 
elements such as machinery, timeclocks, . . . . 
It is no wonder, then, that many software managers 
get into trouble because they forget to think in circles! 
We mean this literally. Managerial problems persist 
because managers continue to believe that there are such 
things as unilateral causation, independent and depen- 
dent variables, origins, and terminations. 
Consider, as an example, the feedback loop of Figure 
4a. It portrays how project work is accomplished 
through (1) the utilization of project resources (work 
force, facilities, equipment). As work is accomplished 
on the project (2), it is reported (3) through some project 
control system. Such reports accumulate and are proc- 
essed to create the pmject’s forecast completion time, by 
adding to the current date the indicated time remaining 
on the job. The feedback loop is completed (closed) as 
the difference, if any, between the scheduled completion 
date and the forecast compleGon date causes adjustments 
(4) in the magnitude or allocation of the project’s 
resources. 
The 90% Syndrome 323 
Work Force 
(3) 
Figure 4. (a) Project control feedback loop. 
The simplicity of the feedback loop of Figure 40 can 
be deceiving. Realize that it provides only a very high- 
level overview of the project control process. At a more 
detailed level, a far more complex conglomerate of 
interconnected feedback loops exists. As an example, 
consider the relationship between the human resource 
level and the rate at which project work is accomplished. 
The relationship is not simply one where a higher level 
of project resources translates automatically into a 
higher work rate. One vital aspect of software project 
dynamics is portrayed by the feedback loop of Figure 
4b. It depicts the dynamic forces that create the 
phenomenon known as “Brooks’ law,” i.e., that adding 
more people to a late software project can make it later 
[17]. As the figure indicates, adding more people can 
lead to higher communication and training overheads on 
the project, which can, in turn, dilute the team’s 
productivity. Lower productivity translates into a lower 
progress rate, which could delay the late project even 
further. This, then, could trigger an additional round of 
workforce additions and yet another pass around this 
“vicious cycle” [ 131. 
5. PROJECT CONTROL: PERCEPTIONS VERSUS 
REALITY 
The model’s Control subsystem captures the processes 
involved in tracking and reporting progress on the 
project. An important aspect of this function is that 
perceptions of project progress can often be quite 
different from reality. 
Because software is basically an intangible product 
during most of the development process, “It is difficult 
to measure performance in programming. . . . It is 
difficult to evaluate the status of intermediate work such 
as underdebugged programs or design specifications and 
their potential value to the complete project” [ 181. 
Lacking precise tools to measure progress, software 
managers often turn to a “surrogate” measure of 
progress-the use of the rate of expenditure of project 
resources to measure progress. For example, a project 
for which a total of 100 man-days is budgeted would be 
perceived as being 10% complete when 10 man-days are 
expended; and when 50 man-days are expended, it 
would be perceived as 50 % complete, etc. 
It is essentially impossible for the programmers to estimate 
the fraction of the program completed. What is 45% of a 
program? Worse yet, what is 45 % of three programs? HOW 
is he to guess whether a program is 40% or 50% complete? 
The easiest way for the programmer to estimate such a 
figure is to divide the amount of time actually spent on the 
task to date by the time budgeted for that task. Only when 
the program is almost finished or when the allocated time 
budget is almost used up will he be able to recognize that 
the calculated figure is wrong. (Baber [5]) 
When progress in the earlier phases of software 
development is measured by the rate of expenditure of 
resources, status reporting ends up being nothing more 
than an echo of the original plan, creating the “illusion” 
that the project is right on track. As the project advances 
toward its final stages, though, work accomplishments 
become relatively more visible. As a result, project 
members become increasingly more able to measure 
progress on the basis of the work actually accomplished. 
The change that occurs in the level of project visibility 
c Productivity > 
Pro ress 8 
Rate. 
Communications & Figure 4. (b) Feedback loop for Brooks’ law. 
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is gradual, not abrupt. In the model, this is captured by in the calculation of the “perceived % of work accom- 
the “visibility factor” (VSBFTR), a weight factor used plished”: 
PERCEIVED 96 OF WORK ACCOMPLISHED = VSBFTR * (% OF RESOURCES CONSUMED) 
+ (1 - VSBFTR) * (ACTUAL X OF WORK ACCOMPLISHED) 
In the initial phases of the project, when the rate of 
resource expenditures is used to measure the rate of 
work accomplished, VSBFTR would be set to 1. As the 
project progresses, VSBFTR decreases in value gradu- 
ally, and eventually it equals zero as the project 
approaches its final stages of development. At that stage, 
“perceived % of work accomplished” would be based 
not on how much resources were consumed, but on how 
many project tasks were actually accomplished. The 
exact shape of the visibility factor is, of course, a 
function of the particular organizational setting in which 
the software is developed (e.g., the milestones used, the 
level of automation in the programming environment, 
the reporting procedures). For the DE-A project, 
VSBFTR takes the form shown in Figure 5. For any 
specific project environment, the shape of the visibility 
factor can be derived on the basis of interviews with 
project managers as well as reviews of historical project 
records. 
6. MODEL EXPERIMENTATION 
Figure 6 depicts the model’s simulation of the DE-A 
software project. The model’s results conformed quite 
accurately to the project’s actual behavior (represented 
by the data points in the figure). This simulation run will 
be referred to below as the base-case run. 
The 90% syndrome arises as a result of the interaction 
of two factors, the underestimation of project resources 
and the imprecise measurement of progress due to poor 
visibility. The NASA DE-A project, like most software 
projects, suffered both shortcomings. First, the project’s 
size and development cost were underestimated by 8,400 
DSI and 1100 man-days, respectively. Second, the shape 
of the visibility factor does indicate that the project 
lacked visibility in the first half of its life cycle. 
Two experiments were then performed to answer the 
following questions: What if the project was correctly 
estimated? and what if project progress was (somehow) 
totally visible? 
Visibility Factor (VSBFTR) 
Figure 5. The visibility factor on the DE-A 
project. 
w 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0 
Fraction of Project Work Completed 
380 Time (Days) 
I Design Phase 1 Coding Phase 
-m- -I 
Gres tins 
0 DE-A’s actual “SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE” (Days) 
0 DE-A’s actual “ESTIMATED PROJECT COST IN MAN-DAYS” 
@ DE-A’s actual “WORKFORCE” (Full-Time Equivalent People) 
In the first experiment we resimulated the project 
under the assumption that it was correctly estimated. 
The results, depicted in Figure 7a, show that poor 
visibility alone (without initial underestimation) is not 
sufficient to produce the 90% syndrome. A correct 
estimate of project size (in DSI) and effort (in man-days) 
implies a correct assessment of the project team’s true 
productivity (in DWman-days). Thus, when progress is 
measured in the early stages of the project by resource 
expenditures, such a measure would in fact accurately 
reflect the actual rate of accomplishing the work. 
In Figure 7b, the project’s initial estimates were reset 
back to their undervalued base-case values, and the 
project is instead simulated under the assumption of total 
progress visibility. This is achieved by setting the value 
of the visibility factor to zero. Again, under such 
conditions, the 90% syndrome is not experienced. The 
simulation results thus indicate that initial underestima- 
tion alone (without poor visibility) is not sufficient to 
Figure 6. The DE-A project base-case simulation run. Curves 
are made1 results: symbols indicate actual data. 
produce the syndrome. Because work accomplishments 
would be visible to management, discrepancies between 
actual and planned progress can be detected immedi- 
ately, and thus no invisible backlog of undone tasks 
accumulates that would “surprise” management at the 
latter stages of the project. 
It is interesting to note that the total visibility scenario 
produces a project that is 10% more costly than the 
correct-estimation run. Specifically, the results of the 
two runs were 2168 man-days (correct estimate) and 
2400 man-days (total visibility). 
The reason for this lies in the differences in the 
workforce staffing patterns of the two scenarios. When 
the project is correctly estimated, management can 
correctly determine the size of the workforce required to 
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TIME (Days) 
develop and adopt tools for improving project visibility 
at the- later stages of the life cycle first and then 
progressively move upstream. Historically, this has 
been the strategy for most of the software engineering 
advances in structuring the software development proc- 
Figure 7. (b) Total visibility. 
To model such a strategy, we conducted a series of 
simulation runs in which the visibility factor took the 
forms shown in Figure 8a, where the drop from a value 
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Fignre 8. (a) Visibility improves at end of design phase. 
of 1 (no visibility) to zero (total visibility) gradually 
shifts to the left, The simulation results indicate that the 
90% syndrome phenomenon is not eliminated under 
such a strategy; instertd it merely shifts to earlier phases 
of the project. Figure 8b depicts the case where the 
improvement in visibility occurs as the project ap- 
proaches the end of the detailed design phase. 
The second strategy we investigated is one in which 
the level of project visibility is improved in the early 
phases of the project. This is modeled through visibility 
Figure 9. (a) Second visibility-improvement strategy. 
factor curves of the form shown in Figure 9a. It was 
both interesting and encouraging to find that only a 
modest improvement in the level of visibility was 
necessary to effectively prevent the occurrence of the 
90% syndrome. Figure 9b depicts the results obtained 
when visibility in the project’s early phases is improved 
by only 10% (as measured by the “visibility factor”). 
8. CONCLUSION 
There is ample evidence in the literature to indicate that 
the 90% syndrome is pervasive in so&ware project 
management. Our objective in this paper was to study 
this important phenomenon. The research vehicle used is 
Visibility 
Factor 
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Fraction of Proj 
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a comprehensive System Dynamics simulation model of 
the software development process. Analysis of a NASA 
software project revealed that the problem arises be- 
cause of the interaction of two factors: under estimation 
and imprecise measurement of project progress due to 
poor visibility. 
Curing the 90% syndrome requires the development 
and adoption of better tools both for the estimation of 
cost and schedule and for the measurement of project 
progress. While several quantitative software estimation 
models have been developed and widely publicized in 
the literature, software cost and schedule estimation 
continue to be major difficulties [20, 251. Furthermore, 
the portability of such models (i.e., in maintaining their 
level of estimation accuracy when utilized in organiza- 
tions other than those in which they are developed) has 
proven to be quite poor [2 11. To achieve progress in this 
area will, therefore, require that software-producing 
organizations invest the time and effort necessary to 
develop and maintain databases of organization-specific 
software project metrics (cost, duration, error rate, 
staffing level, etc.). The data colle&d can then be 
analyzed to determine how the distribution of actual 
software costs in a particular environment differ from 
those incorporated in the estimation model(s) adopted, 
and the difference fed back into an improved cost- 
estimation model calibrated to the organization’s experi- 
ence [6, 211. 
Strategies for improving project visibility were also 
investigated in this pqper. It was found that only a 
modest imprevement in progress visibility in the early 
phases of a software project is needed to effectively 
280, 308, Time (Days) 
Figure 9. (b) 10% visibility improvement in earlier phases. 
prevent the “90 % syndrome. ’ ’ Several approaches have 
been proposed in the literature for improving project 
visibility, including project reviews [22], unit develop- 
ment folders (UDF) [23], and, most recently, computer- 
aided software engineering (CASE) tools. Recent ad- 
vances in workstation technology combined with an 
overall attempt to automate all segments of the systems 
development life cycle has spawned a variety of new 
computer-aided tools designed to provide a “seamless” 
automated environment for the development of applica- 
tion software. A fully configured CASE system is 
differentiated from other “workbench’‘-type tools be- 
cause it provides automated assistance for all aspects of 
software development including a base set of manage- 
ment tools for project definition, estimation, scheduling, 
status reporting, and process control. “By automating 
the systems development life cycle, and executing the 
project through an on-line system, management has both 
the ability to directly influence the tasks that are being 
completed, and the visibility into the project itself that 
would be impossible to achieve if the deliverables are 
distributed in file-folders, manuals or binder,” [24]. 
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